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“BUT MAYBE EVERYTHING THAT DIES 
SOMEDAY COMES BACK”1 
THE DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY: AN 
INVISIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. By David L. 
Sloss.2 New York: Oxford University Press. 2016 pp. xiv + 
472. $85.00. 
Martin S. Flaherty3 
Among the latest challenges to our constitutional order is the 
swift rise of a “post-factual” culture. Politicians, pundits, bloggers, 
and the tweetocracy now regularly do more than make arguments 
unsupported by facts or even outright lie. Now they proudly 
advance views based on “alternative facts” that show an 
indifference to the very idea of truth versus falsehood. As the 
philosopher Harry Frankfurt wrote, this is especially pernicious, 
because it undermines the basis for almost any discourse.4 As 
many have pointed out in the last year, democratic debate on 
matters of public policy simply cannot proceed unless there is 
some widespread agreement that some matters constitute facts 
which form a basis to govern and some matters are fiction, on 
which not so much. 
An uncomfortable truth is that a similar phenomenon has 
long characterized perhaps the most heavily footnoted, elite, 
academic speciality there is: legal scholarship. The lack of peer 
review, the urgent need for timely publication, and perhaps a 
preference for theory all offer temptations to cut corners. Law’s 
distinctily adversarial nature adds an incentive to employ 
whatever convinces, regardless of its grounding in reality. Perhaps 
 
 1. BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, “Atlantic City,” in NEBRASKA (Columbia Records 1982). 
 2. Professor of Law, Santa Clara University. 
 3. Leitner Family Professor of International Human Rights, Fordham Law School; 
Visiting Professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton 
University. My thanks to Christopher Pioch for invaluable research assistance. 
 4. See HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT (2005). 
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nowhere does this remain truer than in the use of history in 
constitutional interpretation.5 
David Sloss’s exemplary The Death of Treaty Supremacy 
offers an antidote and a challenge. Typical of Professor Sloss’s 
work, it reflects prodigious research capable of recovering 
forgotten chapters of constitutional history and challenging the 
conventional wisdom. The Death of Treaty Supremacy does both. 
Today, standard doctrine holds that “non-self-executing” treaties 
that require implementation by Congress cannot themselves bind 
the states, notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause’s declaration 
that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”6 Sloss’s antidote demonstrates that for over a 
century and a half, this was not the case. Instead, the Supremacy 
Clause meant what it said. All treaties, whether requiring 
congressional implementation or not, bound state action. Change, 
almost unnoticed by the general public, came after World War II, 
when the United Nations Charter and other treaties protecting 
human rights, among other things, threatened Jim Crow in the 
South. Congress responded by floating what became known as the 
“Bricker Amendment,” which would have eliminated this treaty 
supremacy rule. The amendment went down to narrow defeat, but 
with the cost of accepting a new constitutional understanding—
that the treaty supremacy rule is an optional rule that applies only 
to “self-executing” treaties. 
With this account comes the challenge. On what theory is the 
death of treaty supremacy legitimate? Sloss has identified one of 
the few specific doctrines that real facts indicate commanded a 
near consensus among the Founders. He has also shown how that 
doctrine prevailed for over 150 years. Its death, however, did not 
obviously come through any conventional or even unconventional 
means of constitutional amendment. The change did not come 
through Article V. Nor did it obviously occur through various 
theories of informal constitutional change. There has yet to be 
fundamental evolution in relevant constitutional custom or 
tradition, still less one manifested by a consistent line of case law. 
 
 5. Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995) [hereinafter Flaherty, History “Lite”]. 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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Nor can what occurred be easily deemed even a minor 
“constitutional moment.” One reason informal theories run into 
trouble, as Sloss points out, is the paucity of contemporary debate 
around treaty supremacy’s demise. This is in part what he means 
by an “invisible constitutional change” (p. 8). 
This dramatic departure from text and history is not without 
certain ironies. In recent years, conservative “sovereigntists,” who 
are skeptical about receiving international norms into U.S. 
domestic law, have likewise been conservative with respect to 
constitutional interpretation. More often than not they have at 
least attempted—often poorly—to ground their positions with 
some mixture of text, original understanding, and ongoing 
constitutional tradition. “Internationalists,” with certain 
exceptions, have often entered the lists with arguments based 
upon the imperatives of modern international relations.7 Sloss 
marshalls an exceptionally rigorous historical account to make the 
case for treaty supremacy overwelming. The Death of Treaty 
Supremacy may not fully answer all the defenders of this 
particular execution. It does, however, shift the burden to those 
who seek to defend the de facto amendment as de jure. 
THE SUPREME LAW FORMERLY KNOWN  
AS TREATY SUPREMACY 
The metaphorical Death of Treaty Supremacy begins with the 
real death of Ernesto Medellin. On August 8, 2008, the State of 
Texas executed Medellin, a Mexican national convicted of capital 
murder. That execution violated the provisions of at least two 
treaties to which the United States is a party. First was the 
somewhat obscure Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. 
Article 36 of the Vienna Consular Convention holds that if a 
detained foreign national requests, “the competent authorities of 
the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post 
of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of 
that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending 
trial or is detained in any other manner.”8 In plain English, 
nationals arrested in one state have a right to be informed that 
 
 7. See STEPHEN A. SIMON, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE DOMESTIC FORCE 
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 180–82 (2016). 
 8. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 
596 U.N.T.S. 261 (entered into force with respect to the United States Dec. 24, 1969). See 
also DAVID L. SLOSS, THE DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY 311 (2016). 
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they can meet with members of their State’s consulate. Typical of 
most U.S. domestic states, Texas never conveyed this information 
to Medellin. Unaware of the treaty, Medellin not surprisingly 
failed to raise it at trial or on direct appeal. When, with more 
informed counsel, he sought to do so on habeas, the Texas courts 
ruled that he had effectively waived the opportunity by his failure 
to raise the issue beforehand.9 In similar circumstances, the 
Supreme Court had previously ruled that reliance on a domestic 
U.S. state’s “procedural default rule” did not constitute a 
violation of the Convention.10 
The International Court of Justice had already registered its 
disagreement with the United States’ earlier position.11 In a case 
known as Avena, Mexico brought an action against the United 
States on behalf of 51 Mexicans on death row in the United States 
who had not been informed of their Vienna Convention rights, 
including Medellin.12 The ICJ held that the procedural default 
rule could not preclude review of cases in which the Vienna 
Convention had been violated. To the contrary, the Court 
directed the United States to reopen the conviction before a non-
executive body. Relying on this decision, Medellin at the Supreme 
Court argued that the United States had to provide him with such 
a review. Further, he pointed to Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, 
the other relevant treaty. In particular, Medellin relied on Article 
94, which states that “[e]ach Member of the United Nations 
undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court 
of Justice in any case to which it is a party.”13 
The Supreme Court rejected Medellin’s claim. Among other 
things, it held that the U.N. Charter provision was not “self-
executing,” and so an Act of Congress was needed for ICJ 
decisions involving the United States to apply domestically. As 
such, the Charter failed to make the Avena decision binding on 
Texas. Likewise, the Court held that, without a federal statute, the 
President lacked any power to implement the ICJ decision against 
Texas. As Sloss says, with self-conscious understatement, “[t]he 
 
 9. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 501–03 (2008). 
 10. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (rejecting Vienna Convention argument 
of Paraguayan national on death row in Virginia). 
 11. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, 
55–60 (Mar. 31) [hereinafter Avena]; Germany v. United States (LaGrand), Judgment, 
I.C.J. 2001 I.C.J. 466, 495–98 (Jun. 27). 
 12. Avena, supra note 11, at 25. 
 13. U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 1. 
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Supreme Court based its decision on an understanding of the 
Constitution that differed sharply from the Framers’ 
understanding” (p. 1). This entirely correct assessment in turn 
prompts the central question of his study: “How did we arrive at 
a shared understanding that the Constitution permits states to 
violate some treaties, even though the Framers purposefully 
adopted a Constitution that barred states from violating any 
treaties?” (pp. 1-2). 
The stakes involved are both more and less than meets the 
eye. Medellin might matter more if the United States had signed 
more human rights treaties. Yet the nation that in many ways gave 
birth to modern international human rights law is often a 
notorious outlier for its failure to accede to treaties adopted by 
most of the rest of the world. Those few that we have ratified 
invariably come with reservations that more or less limit our 
commitments to no more than the rights already afforded by the 
Constitution. Medellin nonetheless matters a great deal in other 
ways. It remains the case that the United States has ratified at 
least some human rights treaties, including the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights14 and the Convention 
Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment.15 
However much the Senate’s reservations and understandings 
have limited such agreements, treaty supremacy unamended 
could still theoretically bar rights violations by the several states. 
Treaty supremacy would dictate this result, moreover, 
notwithstanding the Senate’s typical addition of a declaration of 
“non-self-execution” (NSE), which posits that a treaty requires 
domestic incorporation by Congress. Beyond these practical 
considerations, Sloss’s book posits a core theoretical inquiry. 
Constitutional amendment, even transformation, outside the 
bounds of Article V may at this point be old hat. But Sloss 
suggests that the change his book describes was “invisible,” 
occurring without significant public discussion or institutional 
struggle. To that extent, his story “suggests that constitutional 
change outside the courts is not always consistent with principles 
of democratic legitimacy” (p. 13). 
 
 14. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 
19, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 15. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987). 
2 - FLAHERTY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/18 11:58 AM 
14 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 33:9 
 
Sloss makes his historical case in the book’s first three (of 
four) parts. Best known is his concise account of the Founding. 
Typically lawyers, judges, and scholars look in vain for a settled 
“original understanding” of constitutional issues that trigger 
modern controversies. Justice Jackson probably didn’t realize 
how right he was when he famously declared, “Just what our 
forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they 
foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials 
almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to 
interpret for Pharaoh.’’16 Treaty supremacy, however, is an 
exception. Sloss shows, briefly, yet in refreshing detail, that one of 
the critical problems leading to the Federal Convention was the 
national government’s inability to ensure compliance with the 
treaties it made. That problem in turn resulted from Congress’ 
lacking any power to compel individual states to abide by the 
nation’s international obligations. Consequent violations 
threatened conflict with major European powers, not least the 
United Kingdom itself. 
The Convention addressed this problem with the Supremacy 
Clause. So problematic were state treaty violations that the 
inclusion of treaties as the “supreme Law of the Land” “was 
crafted to ensure that valid, ratified treaties automatically repeal 
conflicting state laws” (p. 27). The state ratification debates 
confirm this understanding with a remarkably rare degree of 
consensus, notwithstanding disputes about other aspects of 
Federal treaties. To this, what should be familiar, account, the 
book usefully adds nuanced elaborations of the Founding 
understanding to 1800. At the time, whether a treaty was “self-
executing” or not meant not whether it was judicial enforceable 
but rather whether it required an Act of Congress to bind Federal 
officers. A treaty calling for appropriations would; a treaty of 
alliance would not. Sloss, however, rightly stresses that these 
considerations operated wholly apart from the question of 
whether a treaty of its own force bound the states. The Supreme 
Court had no difficulty in answering yes in Ware v. Hylton, in 
which it invalidated a Virginia law that conflicted with the Treaty 
of Paris that ended the Revolution.17 With regard to treaty 
supremacy, in short, consensus endured. 
 
 16. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring); see also Flaherty, History “Lite,” supra note 5. 
 17. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796). 
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The Death of Treaty Supremacy may be at its most rigorous 
in the next part, which shows how treaty supremacy flourished 
through World War II. Overall, Sloss’s careful research describes 
an ongoing dichotomy between treaty supremacy and conceptions 
of self-execution. By far the more complicated story relates to 
self-execution. That story begins with an elegant recapture of 
Chief Justice Marshall’s iconic treaty opinion in Foster v. 
Neilson.18 Foster today usually stands for the proposition that 
treaty-makers can modify the separation of powers rules that 
would govern whether a treaty implementation requires 
congressional action, or even opt out of the treaty supremacy rule 
concerning the states, each a version of what Sloss labels a “one-
step” approach (pp. 65-66). A close and masterful reading of the 
case in context, however, confirms that the case had nothing 
whatever to do with treaty supremacy over state law. Rather, at 
most Chief Justice Marshall meant to declare a rule that a treaty 
provision that required implementation by Congress could not be 
constitutionally enforced by the courts. In this particular instance, 
a treaty with Spain placed the United States under an obligation 
to protect the land titles of grantees from the Spanish King in an 
area disputed between the two nations. Under the property 
conceptions of the time, Marshall believed that congressional 
action was required to perfect land grants made by foreign 
authorities that lacked the clear authority to grant title. With if 
anything greater rigor, the book further considers how non-self-
execution doctrine developed in the political branches and courts 
from 1800 to the end of World War II. Sloss refreshingly concedes 
that “readers who are not particularly interested in technical 
details of self-execution doctrine may wish to skip” this treatment 
(p. 66). Suffice it to say that the doctrine led to debate in the 
political branches, and figured almost not at all in the courts. 
More to the point, this part of The Death of Treaty 
Supremacy demonstrates that even past the Second World War 
the doctrine remained alive, however much it had become 
weakened. During this period Sloss recounts sixty cases in which 
the Supreme Court considered a conflict between a treaty and 
state law. The competition broke exactly even. Treaties prevailed 
in twenty-six cases; state law prevailed on the grounds of no 
conflict in twenty-six others; and in eight instances the Court 
 
 18. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829). 
2 - FLAHERTY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/18 11:58 AM 
16 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 33:9 
 
avoided the merits on other grounds. None of these cases mention 
the need for congressional implementation. More striking, as 
Sloss points out, “none of them even mention the term ‘self-
executing’ or ‘non-self-executing’!” (p. 87). 
With the twentieth century, however, came “seeds of 
change.” Some are familiar. First, “U.S. geopolitical power grew 
steadily from the Spanish-American War in 1898 until the end of 
World War II” (p. 153). Treaty violations were no longer as 
perilous to the nation as they were in its early, weak days. Second, 
a growing positivist conception of international law emphasized 
even further the Westphalian conception that keys on the 
horizontal relations between nation states. This development, too, 
would undermine the idea that treaties between nation states 
would automatically bind their provinces, or in U.S. parlance, the 
several states. 
To these Sloss offers another typically rigorous analysis of 
three more specific developments. For one, influential articles in 
the American Journal of International Law19 and the Harvard Law 
Review20 introduced an “intent” approach to NSE treaties. In 
these pieces, Professor Edwin Dickinson sought to support the 
executive’s seizure of foreign vessels outside U.S. international 
territorial limits pursuant to bilateral “Liquor Treaties” meant to 
facilitate Prohibition. Dickinson apparently was less than 
confident that the Constitution did not require congressional 
action to expand the territorial limits of U.S. criminal law. It 
probably did. He therefore argued that what mattered was not 
separation of powers limits, but rather the intent of the treaty 
makers to have the instrument apply domestically of its own force. 
This would prove crucial. Yet other developments would also be 
significant. So too would the rise of executive discretion in foreign 
affairs leading to World War II. The new intent-based NSE 
doctrine enabled the State Department and the executive 
generally to argue that, as the branch with special insight into the 
intent of the treaty-makers, treaties that enhanced executive 
power were self-executing and those that constrained it were 
NSE. Lastly, the Supreme Court itself began to conflate concepts 
of supremacy, an idea that suggested automatic superiority to 
 
 19. Edwin D. Dickinson, Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing?, 20 AM. J. INT’L. L. 
444, 452 (1926). 
 20. Edwin D. Dickinson, Jurisdiction at the Maritime Frontier, 40 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1926). 
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state law, with preemption, a doctrine mainly developed for 
federal statutes, which to a significant extent turned on 
congressional intent. All these seeds would either blossom or 
germinate, depending on one’s viewpoint, after 1945, when the 
NSE intent doctrine would be extended to treaty supremacy over 
state law. 
The third part of the saga sets out the core of Sloss’s thesis: 
the advent of modern international human rights law led to a 
parochial, nationalist—and frankly racist (my label, not Sloss’s)—
reaction that resulted in the extension of NSE doctrine to treaty 
supremacy over state law. The book’s human rights account 
moves from the familiar to the still unappreciated. As any but the 
most idiosyncratic account holds, World War II and the Holocaust 
prompted the international community, led by the United States, 
to transform international law by addressing how nation states 
treated persons within their territory and jurisdiction. The U.N. 
Charter established the transformation, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights elaborated it as non-binding 
principles, and a series of Covenants and Conventions translated 
these principles into specific binding treaty obligations. Of all the 
freedoms enunciated, the one substantive right that the Charter 
mandated would remain central: enjoyment “without distinction 
as to race, sex, language, or religion.”21 Often overlooked today, 
domestic civil rights activists pounced on the new international 
human rights law featuring equality. Sloss recalls how the 
NAACP, the ACLU, and other groups filed amici briefs in 
numerous cases challenging racially discriminatory state laws as 
violating the U.N. Charter. The Supreme Court generally struck 
down such laws. When it did, however, it relied on constitutional 
grounds rather than the Charter. 
That did not prevent a nationalist backlash that ultimately 
led to “the death of treaty supremacy.” Two catalysts in particular 
triggered the reaction. U.S. accession to the Convention Against 
Genocide “threatened” to accord Congress the authority it 
otherwise would not have to pass an anti-lynching law under the 
logic of Missouri v. Holland.22 Worse, in Fujii v. California,23 a 
California appellate court relied on the U.N. Charter to invalidate 
a state law that prohibited (most) East Asians from owning land.  
 
 21. U.N. Charter, arts. 55 & 56. 
 22. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 23. 217 P.2d 481, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950). 
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At this point, the American Bar Association began in earnest to 
propose measures that would either limit the subject matter that 
treaties could address—meaning not human rights—or make the 
treaty supremacy rule subject to the doctrine of non-self-
execution based on the intent of the treaty makers. These ideas 
were taken up in the Senate, most notably by Ohio’s John Bricker. 
Bricker led a movement to amend the Constitution outright, an 
effort that has borne his name ever since. Sloss makes clear that 
the Bricker Amendment was actually a multi-headed beast. As he 
states: 
Proponents of the Bricker Amendment sought to accomplish 
four distinct goals: (1) to clarify that the Constitution takes 
precedence over a treaty in the event of a conflict, (2) to restrict 
the president’s power to use executive agreements as a 
substitute for Article II treaties, (3) to overrule Missouri v. 
Holland, and (4) to abolish the treaty supremacy rule, or limit 
its scope so that most treaties affecting state law would not 
have any domestic legal effect unless Congress enacted 
implementing legislation (pp. 248-49). 
As Sloss further points out, all but the second goal aimed at 
limiting human rights treaties that would have facilitated civil 
rights, which is to say racial equality, at home. 
Bricker’s forces lost, but exacted a price. The ultimate 
proposal that went before the Senate stated: 
A treaty or other international agreement shall become 
effective as internal law in the U.S. only through legislation by 
the Congress unless in advising and consent [sic] to a treaty the 
Senate . . . shall provide that such treaties may become effective 
as internal law without legislation by the Congress.24  
This version, which created an NSE presumption which, critically, 
extended to treaty supremacy, went down to defeat by a close 
vote. A key factor in the result was the Eisenhower 
Administration, which opposed restrictions on the executive’s 
ability to conclude international agreements. Yet Bricker and his 
supporters won a significant victory along the way. As Sloss notes, 
“[t]hroughout the Bricker Amendment debates, virtually all the 
 
 24. Telegram from the Acting Sec’y of State to the Sec’y of State, at Berlin (Feb. 4, 
1964), in OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, 711.00/2–454, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1952–1954, GENERAL: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MATTERS, VOL. 1, PT. 2, 
DOCUMENT 360 (n.d.); see also DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT 
CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF EISENHOWER’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, 152–153 (1988). 
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participants . . . framed their arguments in a way that viewed 
treaty supremacy as a subset of self-execution” (p. 253). In other 
words, the doctrines that had been distinct for over 150 years were 
effectively combined. It was now assumed treaty-makers could 
opt out of treaty supremacy over state law. 
Why would human rights and civil rights advocates make 
such a concession? Complexity and confusion played a part. Sloss 
makes clear that constitutional law experts tended to understand 
NSE doctrine while international law experts specialized in treaty 
supremacy, which meant that generalists could easily conflate the 
doctrines. More substantively, some Bricker opponents made the 
pragmatic decision that permitting the President and Senate to 
opt out of treaty supremacy might make signing human rights 
treaties less objectionable and preserve the possibility of 
legislative incorporation. Finally, Sloss notes that the Supreme 
Court, not least in Brown v. Board of Education, and for that 
matter California’s Supreme Court in Fujii, obviated human 
rights treaty arguments by relying on the Constitution’s 
protections of civil rights, in particular Equal Protection. Placing 
its drafters under a microscope, Sloss makes the case that treaty 
supremacy’s death certificate came in the form of the Restatement 
(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 
Among other things, the Restatement’s position reflected the 
conflation of NSE and treaty supremacy doctrine during the 
Bricker controversy. It enabled the United States during the Cold 
War to avoid human rights violations if treaty provisions 
commanding racial equality automatically applied to the states. 
And it meant that the U.S. legal community would not have to 
squarely face the reality that international human rights law 
protected rights more extensively than did the Constitution. In the 
end, with virtually no public discussion, what Sloss calls the “de 
facto Bricker Amendment” become part of constitutional law. 
Medellin, the case with which Sloss begins The Death of Treaty 
Supremacy, shows how complete the passing is. 
So, literally in a more comprehensive sense, does the book 
itself. The Death of Treaty Supremacy is as thorough, nuanced, 
and rich a work of legal scholarship as one may hope to find – an 
antidote to what I a while ago termed “history ‘lite.’”25 
Throughout the volume, Sloss shows a firm command of the 
 
 25. Flaherty, History “Lite,” supra note 5. 
2 - FLAHERTY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/18 11:58 AM 
20 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 33:9 
 
relevant scholarship, much often obscure, and the context that it 
creates. More striking, he plunges into the primary sources in a 
depth that would shame the most driven graduate student. That 
rigor, which ranges from eighteenth century essays to centuries of 
case law to draft Restatement provisions by the American Law 
Institute, permits Sloss to either fill in gaps or challenge 
conventional wisdom. 
Out of this effort comes a double irony. The major one is that 
Sloss is so sensitive to history’s complexity that his work will evade 
the legal audiences who could benefit from it most. As the issues 
that the post-9/11 world raised have shown, foreign relations law 
can be daunting and unfamiliar even to specialists. The two 
hundred years of treaty doctrines that Sloss details are complex 
by any measure. As he himself stresses, one reason that at least 
one version of NSE doctrine and treaty supremacy could be 
combined is that experts in either constitutional or international 
law did not always find it easy to keep them conceptually apart. 
Sloss does his best to keep matters clear, with numerous 
“roadmap” paragraphs and even user-friendly doctrinal graphs. 
His account nonetheless remains challenging to follow, in contrast 
to “history ‘lite’” accounts that offer simple and striking stories 
that overlook sheaves of contrary evidence. That said, curiously, 
one area in which the book might have benefited from more detail 
relates to its key claim about opponents of the actual Bricker 
Amendment(s), whether cold warriors in the Eisenhower 
Administration or pragmatic human rights internationalists 
outside, accepting the death of treaty supremacy as the lesser of 
two evils. Here, more quotations, statements, and reports would 
have made Sloss’s case compelling rather than simply clear. Of 
course, part of Sloss’s point is that much of this compromise was 
“invisible,” taking place outside of general public discourse. Even 
so, more overt reliance on the offstage materials would have made 
a strong argument even stronger. 
The point, however, remains plenty strong, these ironies 
notwithstanding. Shorn of complexity, The Death of Treaty 
Supremacy establishes several points that deserve to be widely 
known among constitutional lawyers and scholars. The Founding 
clearly established the doctrine that treaties were supreme over 
state law, whether they required further congressional legislation 
or not. That doctrine prevailed for over a century and a half. As 
with many doctrines, it came to be transformed and, in this 
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instance, all but repealed. Unlike other doctrines, however, the 
change came about—if not quite invisibly—with little public 
discourse, prolonged institutional conflict, landmark elections, or 
judicial deliberation. So little noted or appreciated was the change 
that it took The Death of Treaty Supremacy to restore it to our 
constitutional consciousness. 
TRANSFORMATION OR TRANSGRESSION? 
All of which raises the question: was the death of treaty 
supremacy legitimate or is it an ongong constitutional violation? 
Moving from the descriptive to the normative, the final part of the 
book briefly answers “yes.” Sloss first argues that treaty 
supremacy’s effective repeal has since aquired a measure of 
validity through constitutional custom. Decades of legislative and 
executive practice have legitimized a rule in which the President 
and the Senate can employ a version of NSE doctrine to “opt out” 
of treaty supremacy over state law, though not out of the 
requirement that judges have a duty to adjudicate treaty claims. 
By contrast, he clearly has issues with how treaty supremacy was 
killed off in the first place. His review of several leading theories 
concerning popular constitutional change outside of Article V, at 
least as applied to “the invisible change” he has described, all 
come up wanting. The book therefore ends with less of a 
conclusion than a challenge. There should be further research into 
the other invisible constitutional changes, as well as their 
implications for modern constitutional theory. 
Yet the death of treaty supremacy may be more troubling 
than even Sloss allows. Constitutional custom almost certainly 
affords the best defense for the doctrine’s continuing eclipse. In 
this instance, however, the custom at issue appears insufficient, 
especially as it is made possible by the constitutional anomaly of 
a minority veto in the Senate, itself a democratic anomaly. More 
importantly, the bar for a constitutional change through 
institutional custom would seem higher when the original 
constitutional position is thoroughly entrenched through specific 
text, discernible original understanding, and centuries of custom 
confirming the initial commitment. Conversely, Sloss is on firmer 
ground doubting that theories of popular constitutionalism can 
account for the de facto amendment he recounts. As he suggests, 
all of the leading approaches in this case come up wanting based 
on democratic considerations alone. As he could have suggested 
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more forcefully, the change he describes fails even more strikingly 
based on considerations of justice. The death of treaty supremacy 
was unconstitutional not just because it did not engage the public 
for the purposes of democratic deliberation. It was also 
illegitimate insofar as it was designed to protect America’s version 
of apartheid from international human rights treaties. It follows 
that the most principled response to the death of treaty supremacy 
may be simply . . . to resurrect the doctrine of treaty supremacy. 
Of course this conclusion need not follow if the repeal of the 
rule, however illegitimate initially, gained the status of a new 
constitutional standard in light of subsquent custom. Here Sloss 
adopts the approach attributed to Justice Frankfurter in 
Youngstown. Justice Frankfurter’s famous concurrence set out 
the idea that unbroken, systematic executive action, combined 
with congressional acquiescence, can help confirm the 
constitutionality of that practice.26 Sloss, as noted, argues that 
executive branch lawyers during the Bricker Amendment 
controversy put forward the view that the President and Senate 
could sidestep the treaty supremacy rule, among other ways, by 
stipulating that a treaty was NSE, a move that would then enable 
the United States to sign human rights treaties but avoid the dire 
consquence of having international legal standards upend Jim 
Crow. Again, with typically rigorous research, Sloss recounts 
numerous treaties which the Senate approved subject to an NSE 
declaration. These instances, he argues, show an ongoing custom 
that assumes such a declaration suffices as an opt-out of treaty 
supremacy.27 
Sloss’s concession apparently strives for a moderate position, 
but in the end is made too readily. Accepting the idea that the 
President and Senate can now opt out of treaty supremacy 
through NSE doctrine serves as a kind of strategic retreat that 
enables Sloss to defend other positions that remain protective of 
human rights, for example, that the political branches cannot 
decide to maintain an NSE treaty as the supreme law of the land, 
yet render it unenforceable in the courts. Whether this back-up 
position is worth defending is an open question. The more 
 
 26. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593–614 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
 27. He further notes that there is no similarly clear custom that assumes an NSE 
declaration can mean something else: that a treaty is federal law but cannot be enforced 
by the courts (what he calls “no judicial enforcement” or NJE doctrine) (pp. 298, 303–06). 
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fundamental problem, however, is the claim that custom justifies 
the death of treaty supremacy in the first place. Even on its own 
terms, the practice that the book cites is limited and recent. By its 
count, the Senate has employed NSE declarations that among 
other effects deny treaty supremacy in only about two dozen 
instances. This custom, moreover, as a consistent matter, dates 
back only to the 1990s. Further worth noting is the idiosyncratic 
mechanism through which this particular custom occurs. 
Presumably, one justification for reliance on political branch 
practice is the democratic basis on which the President and 
Congress act. Any custom that both consistently establish 
ostensibly reflects more general approval by the American 
electorate. Now consider the treaty context. Under the Treaty 
Clause, only one-third plus one of a quorum of the Senate, already 
a seriously flawed body from a democratic perspective, suffices to 
insist on an NSE declaration for a given treaty. A limited, recent 
custom based on such an extreme minority veto falls short as a 
basis to amend the Constitution. 
More importantly, Sloss sets the theoretical bar too low. 
Justice Frankfurter, and in a roundabout way Justice Jackson as 
well, discussed constitutional practice at most as a gap-filler in 
areas in which conventional methods of constitutional 
interpretation left significant space for the political branches to 
work out pragmatic understandings. A classic instance in this 
regard is or should be congressional limits on the President’s 
removal power.28 That is not the case with treaty supremacy. The 
most natural reading of the the Supremacy Clause makes the rule 
mandatory: “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”29 The original understanding, for once, 
confirms that the consensus view of this provision was for treaties 
to check violations of U.S. treaty obligations without 
implementing legislation by Congress. This very book, moreover, 
makes abundantly clear that over a century and a half of 
consistent practice took this understanding for granted. A theory 
of customary constitutional change might allow for so entrenched 
a doctrine to be amended by later practice. But if so, it would seem 
 
 28. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996). 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphases added). 
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to follow that such a theory would require a consistent, repeated, 
longstanding, and open practice that is compelling. 
The book ends on firmer ground in questioning whether 
other theories of constitutional change can account for the 
transformation it describes. Here Sloss is more interested in 
raising the concern than resolving it. The approaches he considers 
he loosely terms “popular” constitutionalism. By this, he alludes 
to a school of thought that seeks to justify constitutional change 
outside the formal mechanisms of Article V that nonetheless rests 
on some discernible form of popular consent. Though he doesn’t 
develop the distinction, the theories he has in mind differ from 
custom in an important respect. Whereas custom represents 
incremental legitimation through consistent institutional practice, 
“popular” constitutional approaches emphasize change that is 
more discrete, dramatic, and deliberative—something closer to 
securing an actual amendment, however informally. So defined, 
any approach along these lines runs into trouble legitimating the 
death of treaty supremacy, and for the same reason. Popular 
forms of constitutionalism, almost by definition, depend on public 
consideration of a proposed change. On Sloss’s account, treaty 
supremacy died almost unnoticed, save for a small group of 
lawyers in the executive branch, elite bar associations, and the 
academy. 
This relative invisibility undermines reliance on two theories 
Sloss mentions, and one that he curiously does not. The missing 
approach traces to Bruce Ackerman, who in many ways 
pioneered modern notions of popular constitutional amendment 
beyond Article V.30  Treaty supremacy’s demise can find no 
justification in an Ackermanian account for several reasons. As a 
hidden change, it produced no sustained inter-branch struggle, no 
critical elections, no sustained popular discourse. If anything, this 
particular change appears in tension with the popular 
internationalism that Ackerman and David Golove maintain 
characterized the final element of constitutional change under 
Franklin Roosevelt, a chapter that among other things resulted in 
ratification of the U.N. Charter and the legitimation of 
 
 30. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE 
THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014). 
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congressional-executive agreements.31 Nor, as Sloss does point 
out, does the repeal of treaty supremacy find ready justification in 
Larry Kramer’s more open-ended conception of popular 
constitutional change. Kramer’s approach emphasizes popular 
movements as channeled through Congress and the President.32 A 
barely noted “amendment” championed by a small group of 
executive branch lawyers falls well short of Kramer’s target. 
Finally, Sloss considers Jack Balkin’s important work seeking to 
reconcile the demands of originalism with the more open-ended 
change of a “living constitution.”33 For this approach, there would 
appear to be trouble enough that what becomes [a] subject of 
living change was a clear textual rule that commanded something 
close to an original consensus. Sloss, for his part, notes Balkin’s 
argument that not all specific changes need meet general 
requirements of legitimacy so long as the system of constitutional 
change as a whole does. Yet, even here, Sloss rightly cautions that 
invisible constitutional change may fall short of a requirement for 
some sustained public consideration even under Balkin’s 
approach. 
All told, the fate of treaties as the supreme law of the land, 
notwithstanding anything in the constitution or laws of any state 
to the contrary, finds scant justification under any theory of 
constitutional change that presupposes some degree of public 
awareness, much less deliberation, custom included. But that is 
not the worst part. 
Yet unmentioned are theories of constitutional legitimacy 
that emphasize, not democratic pedigree, but conceptions of 
justice. Theorists who arguably fall into this camp include Larry 
Sager,34 Steve Macedo,35 James Fleming,36 and, still towering over 
all, Ronald Dworkin.37 The differences and nuances 
 
 31. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & DAVID GOLOVE, IS NAFTA CONSTITUTIONAL? 
(1995). 
 32. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
 33.  See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2014). 
 34. See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004). 
 35. See STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND 
COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990). 
 36. See JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR 
MORAL READINGS AND AGAINST ORIGINALISMS (2015). 
 37. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996). 
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distinguishing these and associated scholars one from another are 
many. Suffice it to say that they reflect an approach to 
constitutional theory that posits a constitutional regime’s 
commitment to justice, however defined, as a component of its 
validity. From this perspective, the transformation that Sloss 
recounts is a transgression. As noted, his book leaves no doubt 
that the newfound resistance to treaty supremacy post-World War 
II was a direct response to newly minted human rights treaties that 
posed a direct threat to old-fashioned domestic racial 
discrimination. Sloss characterizes this factor as vividly yet 
somewhat charitably a need to believe in American 
exceptionalism: 
[Then and now] we cling to our faith in the superiority of the 
U.S. constitutional system, but domestic protection for human 
rights falls short of international standards. International 
human rights law provides a mirror that tells us who is “the 
fairest of them all.” Like the queen in Snow White, we do not 
like the answer, so we refuse to look in the mirror (pp. 4-5). 
Sloss is right in noting that the death of treaty supremacy 
“helps us avert our gaze from the unflattering answer the mirror 
provides” (p. 5). Yet its consequences go beyond that. At the 
time, the invisible constitutional change specifically protected Jim 
Crow, lynching, and racial discrimination generally. Today, it 
allows a superminority in the Senate to block international law 
further addressing the rights of torture victims,38 women,39 the 
disabled,40 and children,41 to name a few. In normative terms, the 
repeal of the Founding treaty rule ironically has more in common 
with Founding’s embrace of racial inequity than it does with any 
modern theory of justice. 
In this light, the better course is not to attempt legitimating a 
constitutional transformation with no obvious justifiction. Rather, 
it is to recognize an unconstitutional transgression and restore the 
commitment that existed previously—to press for a day when that 
commitment comes back. Either way, The Death of Treaty 
 
 38. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987). 
 39. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sep. 3, 1981). 
 40. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted Dec. 13, 2006, 
2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008). 
 41. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
(entered into force Sep. 2, 1990). 
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Supremacy magnificently uncovers a timely challenge that should 
no longer remain invisible. 
